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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
HAROLD EARL BUSHMAN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20080979-CA 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction hi this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-103(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Whether the trial court erred in denying Bushman's motion to dismiss based on 
double jeopardy because the civil fine previously imposed by the State constituted 
punishment. This issue presents a question of law reviewed for correctness. State v. 
Mendoza, 938 P.2d 303, 305 (Utah App. 1997). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All relevant statutory provisions are set forth in the Addenda of the Appellant's 
Brief. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Harold Earl Bushman appeals from the judgment and sentences of the Honorable 
Samuel McVey, Fourth District Court, after the denial of his motion to dismiss and the 
entry of conditional pleas to violations of Utah Code Annotated § 61-1-1. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Harold Earl Bushman was charged by criminal information filed on September 10, 
2007 in Fourth District Court with: Count 1 - pattern of unlawful activity, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-1603; Count 2 - securities 
fraud, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 61-1-1; Counts 3-
12 - securities fraud, third degree felonies in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 61-1-1 
i Xv. \J*3 ~'\J i j . 
At the preliminary hearing held on May 19, 2008, the Court found probable cause 
to bind Counts 1-11 over for trial (R. 58-56). Count 12 was bound over as an attempted 
securities fraud (R. 280: 74-75). 
On July 30, 2008 Bushman filed a motion to dismiss (R. 111-103). He argued that 
the State was seeking to punish him multiple times for the same offense in violation of 
the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution (R. 
108). Specifically, he argued that the terms of a Stipulation and Consent Order, 
previously entered into with Utah Attorney General Division of Securities, constituted a 
prior punishment which would bar further criminal prosecution (R. 107-106). In its 
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response, the State argued that the Stipulation and Consent Order was civil in nature and 
that a later criminal punishment would, therefore, not invoke the Fifth Amendment (R. 
118-113). The State also argued that the remedies imposed by the order are more similar 
to traditional civil remedies than to criminal punishments and that the sanctions are not so 
disproportionate as to render them punitive (Id.). 
On August 25, 2008, the trial court heard oral arguments on the motion and denied 
the motion to dismiss (R. 187-185, 232). The court held that the consent order with the 
Division of Securities, which is an administrative body, and that the Fifth Amendment 
was not implicated by this (R. 232: 14-15). The court also held that the consent order was 
not a criminally punitive sanction and would not "place a person in jeopardy" (R. 
232:15). 
On August 27, 2008 Bushman waived his right to a jury trial and pled guilty to 
one couni of securities fraud, a third degree felony, and six counts of attempted securities 
fraud, class A misdemeanors, conditioned on his right to appeal the denial of his motion 
to dismiss (R. 202-189). 
On October 20, 2008, Bushman was given a suspended sentence of up to five 
years in prison and six suspended sentences of one year in jail, ordered to spend 5 days in 
the Utah County Jail. He was placed on probation for 204 months with early termination 
authorized upon full payment of $30,000 plus interest in restitution, and ordered to pay a 
suspended fme of $1100, plus surcharge and interest (R. 211-206; 214-212). 
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On November 20, 2008, a Notice of Appeal was filed with the Fourth District 
Court (R. 90) (R2. 216). An extension for the timely filing of the notice of appeal was 
granted by the trial court (R. 220). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Preliminary Hearing: May 19, 2008 
A. Testimony of Darrall Jensen 
Darrall Jensen entered into a contract on September 11, 2002 with Harold Earl 
Bushman to loan him a sum of money (R. 230:6). The contract stated that Jensen would 
loan Bushman $30,000 for a two-month period, after which he would be repaid that sum 
plus 20 percent interest by January 6, 2003 (R. 230:7-8). Bushman told him that he had 
recently sold some shares of stock and would receive the profits from that sale in a few 
mourns ana neeaea to DOITOW tne money until tnen (K. 230. 6). 
As of one year later, September 2003, Jensen had not received any repayment and 
contacted Bushman to ask for the money (R. 230:9). After repeated requests and arranged 
meetings at which Bushman didn't show, Jensen still had not received any of money (R. 
230:9). At the time of the preliminary hearing Jensen had not received any money in 
repayment of the loan (R. 230:9-10). 
B. Testimony of Geoff Germaine 
Geoff Germaine entered into a contract with Bushman on March 21, 2005 for a 
loan of $5,000 that would be repaid with 10 percent interest by July 1, 2005 (R. 230:15). 
He was told that Bushman needed it only for a short time and would repay him from 
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some sort of medical malpractice suit in which he was involved and expecting a 
settlement (R. 230:15). On May 6, 2005 Bushman approached Germaine for admihMia. 
fi mds in the an i :: i u it of $1 ,600 f :)i some expenses related to his :hildi en (R 230:15 16). 
This was to be only a short-term loan and the agreement was that it would be repaid by 
May 11, 2005 only 5 days later (R. 230:16). Germaine did not receive payment on either 
of those loans a: in.e ^ K U ' -
Gil July 26, 2005 he received a confession o! judgment iiom Bushman (R. 
230:17). The confession of judgmciii ..u knowledged the debts owed to be $5,800 and also 
stated ilitii r.v. w.i ;n .- :.i..u ••; u u ^ loans and was wiu.^ui .. ,;. ICHNC IOI SI^I; •• I. 
2^) , die biiin ui $7,SOu, wuiui would be 
$1,000 in addition to the principal owed no later than August 2. 2005 in the form of:* 
cashici s check . •• ••
 ( - \ ^ • \K confession also stated that there \\< t.,,i , e no grace 
pei i' 
a judgment Ihiough ihe u^e of the confession -K\\. 2/o IM Germaine did not receive 
payment by that date but did receive payment approximately one year later ot the 
pi iin i|ul uwi el < P '" in I!! i. 
C. Testimony of Randy Porter 
On March 7, 2006 Bushman contacted Randy Porter about borrowing some money 
(II 1 230:2/1/) Bi isl i.iri lan 1: ::>l ::! hin i 1:11: ia.1: h ::  ;" 'anted il: :: • I : i in / 1 lis v dfe a pi esent foi a bii 1:1 ida y or 
anniversary and that she monitored the checkbook closely and he asked if he could 
borrow tl le money foi the purchase of that gift until the birthday or am iivei>ar\ passed 
and h.,L ^ . . k i ;M;a. . . . • -iici vomd not remembei uie e \aa anumr: •-. , 
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put it somewhere between $250 and $750, which he gave him in the form of a personal 
check (R. 230:22). Bushman repaid the money on the agreed date (R. 230:22). 
Several weeks after Bushman repaid the money he again contacted Porter and told 
him that he would be receiving stock options from Intel, a company he did consulting for, 
in the amount of $80,000 (R. 230:23). He told Porter that he was given an option to buy 
the stock for 15 percent below market value and that he planned to buy the stock and then 
sell it immediately (R. 230: 23-24). He said that he would only be able to go in for 
$70,000 this year and that his son was going in for some but he offered Porter the 
opportunity to buy in for $3,000 worth of the stock (R. 230: 24, 29). Porter was told that 
Bushman would buy the stock and pay the taxes on the amount and that he would get the 
$3,000 investment plus 15 percent interest in about a month and a half (R. 230: 24, 29). 
Sometime in May of 2006, Porter gave a personal check for $3,000 to Bushman. After 
xt_: _ : A u. i - - : ^_ J * ^ i - - Q i - - . • ~ -A _ I > I _ >t, ~ _ - ~— ~ - ~t~ ±:~ *-
Liiib iiiVCbiiiiUiil iiC iiiVUbltu Willi ulibiUiidii dppIOXilndieiy imCC ulnci umcb, ca^ii liiiiC iii 
the form of a personal check made out to Earl Bushman (R. 230: 29). 
About a month after the initial stock investment, Bushman contacted Porter and 
told him that everything had gone through and that he would be able to pay him in about 
a week (R. 230: 30). He then asked Porter if he would rather roll that money over into 
another investment, explaining that he was coming up on a season where he could barter 
computer chips and make a good profit (R. 230: 30). Bushman told Porter that he could 
take the initial investment's payout and that combined with another check for $2,500 that 
Porter would have a stake in this particular transaction that he did for business (R. 230: 
30). 
This same situation happened again about a month and a half after this, in 
approximately June 2006 and again another month and a half after that (R. 230: 30-31). 
Each time Bushman would call and explain that the transaction had gone well and that he 
would be able to give him the payment in about a week, but then he would ask Porter if 
he wanted to roll it over into another investment and ask for another sum of money to 
combine with the roll-over investment (R. 230:31). 
After each investment, Bushman gave Porter an unsigned piece of paper stating 
the investment agreement (R. 230: 31). This pattern of rollover investments happened 
four times and Bushman was given approximately $12,000 (R. 230: 33). In September of 
2006 Bushman began repaying Porter (R. 230: 34). There were a number of payments, 
usually in $2,500 increments (R. 230: 34). Eventually Porter was repaid all of the 
principal plus interest on his investments (R. 230: 34). 
D. Testimony of Steven Sandstrom 
Steven Sandstrom was approached by Bushman to invest some money to pay a 
duty on some truck parts that were purportedly stuck in customs in Mexico and was told 
there would be a huge payout from that (R. 230: 45). He gave Bushman a check for 
$2,500 but then had second thoughts and stopped payment on the check (R. 230:45). 
After the initial canceled investment, he made two other investments with 
Bushman (R. 230: 45). In early fall of 2006 Bushman approached Sandstrom and told 
him that he had previously worked with Sun IVIicrosystems and that he had some fantastic 
stock options that he could exercise and make a huge return (R. 230: 46). Bushman said 
that he had to act quickly, however, and that he was short the money he needed to make 
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the transaction (R. 230: 46). He told Sandstrom that if he would give him the money for 
the investment then he would get a good return on the money from the options that he 
would exercise (R. 230:46). Sandstrom then wrote Bushman a check for $3,000 and was 
given a promissory note in return (R. 230:46-47). The note stated that he would be repaid 
the principal plus $240 in interest within two weeks (R. 230:47). He did not receive the 
promised payment in two weeks (R. 230:47). 
When Sandstrom approached Bushman about the money, he was told that he was 
still short some funds because something had happened with the options and that he 
needed additional money to exercise them (R. 230: 47). Sandstrom then wrote Bushman 
another check in the amount of approximately $4,300 (R. 230: 47-48). 
After he still had received no payment Sandstrom began to ask Bushman for the 
money and eventually had his attorney write Bushman a letter (R. 230:49). Bushman then 
contacted him and told him that he had legal counsel and gave hrm a document stating 
that he would pay him the $7,700 owed plus interest and a late penalty for a total of 
$9,000 (R. 230: 49). Sandstrom still did not receive payment, however, and had his 
attorney send Bushman a letter asking that he pay the amount owed or Sandstrom would 
contact the Attorney General's office (R. 230:50). 
Bushman still did not pay and Sandstrom contacted the Attorney General's office 
(R. 230:50). A couple of weeks after that, Sandstrom received payment for the principal, 
in the amount of $7,700 (R. 230:50). 
E. Testimony of Floyd Richey 
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Floyd Richey was originally approached by Bushman several years ago to 
participate in some kind of microchip deal in Ireland but declined the offer (R. 230: 55). 
Richey was again approached by Bushman in late 2006 to participate in a deal similar to 
the one Sandstrom was participating in, but again declined the offer (R. 230: 56). 
F. Testimony of Susan Jones 
Susan Jones is an investigator with the Utah Division of Securities (R. 230:57). 
After receiving a complaint from Lisa Porter, the wife of Randy Porter, she investigated 
Earl Bushman (R. 230:58). After subpoenaing Bushman's employment records and stock 
options from Intel in relation to the stock options he persuaded the Porters to invest in she 
received notification from Intel that he had no such records (R. 230:59). 
She also subpoenaed employment records and stock options from Sun 
Microsystems based on his representation to the Sandstroms (R. 230:59). Again, she was 
informed that there were no such records (R. 230:59). 
In addition, she investigated his claims of repayment from a medical malpractice 
suit and found that he did have a suit pending but that another investor had filed a UCC1 
that would tie up all proceeds for the suit if he were to receive anything (R. 230: 59). 
Jones also testified about the material omissions Bushman had made in not 
disclosing several pending civil suits against him and his default on promissory notes to 
previous investors (R. 230: 61). Jones also testified to Bushman's failure to register the 
notes or inform the investors that he was not licensed to sell securities (R. 230:61-62). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The fine imposed by the Consent Order in this case constituted punishment. 
Accordingly, the subsequent criminal prosecution of Bushman for the same conduct was 
barred by Double Jeopardy, and the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Bushman's Conviction Should Be Reversed because Prosecution was 
Barred in this Matter based on Double Jeopardy. 
In May of 2007, the Utah Department of Commerce Securities Division filed an 
Emergency Order to Cease and Desist and Order to Show Cause against Bushman 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 61-1-20 for alleged violations under Utah Code 
Annotated §61-1-1 (R. 110). 
On July 3, 2007 Bushman and Michael Hines, Director of Enforcement signed a 
Stipulation and Consent Order with the approval and signature of Jeff Buckner, Assistant 
Attorney General (R. 110). The Division of Securities is under the Commercial 
Enforcement division of the Criminal section/division of the Utah Attorney General's 
Office (R. 109). On the same date, Wayne Klein, Director of the Utah Division of 
Securities, signed an Order based upon the Stipulation (R. 109). 
The Consent Order required Bushman to pay a fine of $19,300 that could be 
reduced dollar for dollar up to $14,300 (the amount owed in restitution) for payment to 
the victims. The fine was to be paid to the Division by October 1, 2007 (R. 109). 
However, if Bushman paid the restitution by July 15, 2007 the Division would waive half 
10 
of the remaining $5,000 fine (Id.). Bushman paid the restitution timely and the fine was 
reduced (R. 232: 12). 
In addition the Consent Order contained the following language: "Bushman 
willfully violated § 61-1-1 of the Act by making misrepresentations of material fact and 
omitting to state material facts in connection with the offer and sale of a security in or 
from Utah;" and "... Consent Order does not affect any criminal cause of action that a 
prosecutor might bring;" and "Bushman acknowledges that this Consent Order, upon 
approval by the Division Director, shall be the final compromise and settlement of this 
matter" (R. 109). 
On September 10, 2007 Bushman was charged criminally in Fourth District Court 
for essentially the same violations covered by the Consent Order (R. 5-1). The date of 
the offenses ranged from 2002-2006. See Statement of the Facts. Bushman subsequently 
PA^A ~ ^~±:~„ +~ A:r,~,'-.„r, ~ ~ T ^ ~ . , U 1 ~ T~ A** ~ ~ A„ T V . ^ ^ r i ^ l r r . n r f c u V . c ^ - . n ^ n f h r 
xilV^Li CI l U U U U i i ivj U- i^ in iDO u n i y ' u u U i t J v / W p t U U - j g,iVJUiiU-5. m v t x x t n v u u n o u u o v v | u u n u y 
denied the motion (R. 232: 14-16) and Bushman conditional pleas to one third degree 
felony and six class A misdemeanors (R. 202-189). 
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees that no person 
shall be "subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. 
Const. Amend. V. This provision extends to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 2062, 23 L.Ed.2d 
707 (1969). The theory of double jeopardy provides constitutional protection in three 
different scenarios: (1) to protect against a second prosecution for the same offense after 
acquittal; (2) to protect against a second prosecution for the same offense after 
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conviction; (3) to protect against multiple punishments for the same offense. State v. 
Trafny, 799 P.2d 704, 709 (Utah 1990). See also, United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 
117, 101 S.Ct. 426, 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980). 
The case falls under the third protection outlined in Trafny because Bushman is 
facing multiple punishments for the same offense. Admittedly the protections of the Fifth 
Amendment only apply to multiple criminal punishments for the same offense. United 
States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 247, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 2641, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980) (citing 
Helvermgv. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399, 58 S.Ct. 630, 633, 82 L.Ed.2d 917 (1938)). 
However, this does not automatically mean that all prior punishments that were not 
issued in conjunction with criminal proceedings are allowed under the Fifth Amendment. 
The United States Supreme Court has stated that "in the double jeopardy context it is the 
substance of the action that is controlling, and not the label given that action." 
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 142, 101 S.Ct. at 440 (citing United States v. Martin Linen 
Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571, 97 S.Ct. 1349, 1354, 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (1977)). The Court 
analyzed this issue in U.S. v. Ward. In Ward the Supreme Court considered whether a 
fine imposed by the government for a leakage in an on-shore drilling facility was 
criminal, implicating Fifth and Sixth Amendment Constitutional rights. 448 U.S. at 247. 
In making this determination, the Court has set out a two-prong test: (1) Did Congress 
expressly or impliedly indicate that the remedy is civil or criminal? and (2) Where 
Congress had indicated that the remedy is civil, is the remedy so punitive either in 
purpose or effect as to negate that intention? Id. at 248-249; Hudson v. U.S., 522 U.S. 93, 
99(1997). 
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A. The Remedy under Utah Code Annotated § 61-1-1 Is Not Solely Civil in Nature. 
In the Ward case the Supreme Court held that Congress intended § 311(b)(6) to 
impose a civil penalty and the fact that § 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act 
of 1899 makes criminal the conduct that is also penalized civilly under § 311 (b)(6) does 
not render the civil penalty criminal in nature. 
In contrast to Ward, Bushman is being punished twice under the same section of 
the Securities Division Act. Bushman entered into a consent order based on a violation of 
§ 61-1-1. That matter has now been resolved and restitution and a fine have been paid. 
However, he is now being charged by the Utah County Attorney's office with violation 
of the same section, § 61-1-1. 
The enforcement and penalties of § 61-1-1 are found in separate sections 
contained within the Act. The enforcement provision can be found in § 61-1-20. This 
enforcement provision provides for a cease and desist order; it allows the Director of 
Enforcement to impose a fine, suspend the perpetrator from associating with a licensed 
broker-dealer or investment adviser, and bring an action in district court for an injunction, 
restraining order, declaratory judgment, disgorgement, rescission, and a fine. U.C.A. 61-
1-20 (1994). The penalty provision of the act can be found in § 61-1-21. Specifically, § 
61-1-21(4) states, "[i]n addition to any other penalty for criminal violation of this chapter, 
the sentencing judge may impose any penalty or remedy provided for in Subsection 61-1-
20-(2)(b)." This would indicate that the judge, at sentencing, is able to combine the 
sections of the act to order an appropriate punishment. The enforcement of the Act is 
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civil, but the penalties are criminal. Thus, after penalizing Bushman for violation of § 61-
1-1 the state is precluded by Double Jeopardy from once again pursuing criminal charges 
and penalties. 
B. Even if the Legislature Intended the Remedy to be Civil It is Punitive and 
Triggers the Protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
Even if the remedy is civil, the remedy is punitive in nature and would negate the 
intention of the State legislature that it be a purely civil remedy. The consent agreement 
incorporated a criminal penalty and thus, implicated the Double Jeopardy clause. 
In State v. Arbon, 909 P.2d 1270 (UT App. 1996) this Court considered whether 
an administrative license suspension for DUI constituted punishment for double jeopardy 
purposes. In examining this issue, this Court "recognized that 'a civil as well as a 
criminal sanction constitutes punishment when the sanction ... serves the goals of 
punishment,"' which are retribution and deterrence." 909 P.2d at 1272 (quoting United 
States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 1901-02, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989)). 
In other words, "'a civil sanction, in application, may be so divorced from any remedial 
goal that it constitutes "punishment" for the purposes of double jeopardy.'" State v. 
Mendoza, 938 P.2d 303, 306 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting Halper, 490 U.S. at 443, 109 
S.Ct. at 1899). 
Ulitmately this Court in Arbon held: "Having determined (1) the historical 
purpose of licensing programs is to safeguard public health and safety and (2) the specific 
purpose of the statutory scheme at issue is remedial or protective, we hold administrative 
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driver's license suspensions for DUI do not constitute punishment for double jeopardy 
purposes." 909 P.2d at 1275. 
The present case is easily distinguishable from Arbon. The revocation of a driver's 
license is the revocation of a privilege that was voluntarily granted by the state. The 
purpose of such a revocation is to protect the public, not to punish the individual driver. 
As the Court stated, "no reference to the goals of punishment exists in the sections of the 
Act that outline causes and puiposes of license revocations and suspensions. Id at 1274. 
The Act in the Bushman case is clearly for the puiposes of punishment, as is clearly 
outlmedby §§ 61-1-20 and 61-1-21. 
The present case can also be distinguished from this Court's holding in State v. 
Mendoza, 938 P.2d 303 (Ut. App 1997). In Mendoza the Court held that a $200 fine and 
thirty days in isolation imposed by the prison disciplinary board for assault on a prison 
guard did noi implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause and therefore did not bar further 
prosecution in the district court for assault on a correctional officer. Id. The lower court 
found that the $200 went toward reimbursing the prison the costs of the disciplinary 
board hearing and that the isolation was to encourage proper inmate behavior, as well as 
rehabilitation. The Court of Appeals affirmed. In dicta the Court indicated, "the order of 
the proceedings is irrelevant; if the civil sanction constitutes punishment under double 
jeopardy, then a subsequent prosecution for the same conduct is barred." Id. at n.3. 
In the present case, Bushman was investigated by the Division of Securities and 
found in violation of §61-1-1. He entered into an order based on his violation of §61-1-1 
of the Utah Uniform Securities Act. The terms of the Stipulation and Consent Order 
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specifically stated that "Bushman violated § 61-1-1 of the Act." Based on this violation 
he was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $14,300 and a fine in the amount of 
$5000 to the Division. He was told that if he was to pay the victims in full before the 
deadline of July 15, 2007 that the fine would be reduced to $2,500. He complied in full 
with the order and paid the full restitution to the victims and the reduced fine of $2500. 
Unlike the Mendoza case there has been no finding of the necessity of this fine. 
There has been no indication of what the fine's purpose was or whether or not it was to 
cover costs incurred by the Division. At any rate, Bushman paid his victims directly and 
the Division had little involvement with the matter after the consent order was signed. 
The fine constituted a penalty and was intended to punish Bushman. The punitive nature 
of the fine therefore negated any intention that the remedy pursued by the Division of 
Securities be purely civil in nature. Therefore, the prior consent order constituted a prior 
_ • *• _ r_ _ P ^ I _ T ^ _ _ I _ I _ T _ _ _i_ _ r\\ _ _ _ _ J ^i- _ i _ J_^ _ __ ^ ' ~ „ 1, ^U -
COiiViCliOii IOI plilpuSeS Oi me UOUuiC Jeopdiuy ^IalibC dliu Hid ialLCI plu^eCUlluii u'y liic 
Utah County Attorney's office is barred. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Harold Bushman respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss, vacate his conditional pleas, and 
remand this case to the Fourth District Court for further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 20T H day of July, 2009. 
Margaret P. Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) true and conect copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, 
Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this 20™ day of July, 2009. 
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ADDENDA 
18 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 61. Securities Division-Real Estate Division 
*li Chapter 1. Utah Uniform Securities Act (Refs & Annos) 
-+ § 61-1-1. Fraud unlawful 
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of any security, directly or indirectly to: 
(1) Employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; 
(2) Make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading; or 
(3) Engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any 
person. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1963, c. 145, § 1; Laws 1983, c. 284, § 4. 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Uniform Law 
iiiis section is similar to ^ mi oi tue ^niiorm occuntics r\ci \ lyjvj. oee v oiurne / w uniiorm Laws Annotated, 
Master Edition, or ULA Database on Westlaw. 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 61. Securities Division-Real Estate Division 
^ii Chapter 1. Utah Uniform Securities Act (Refs & Annos) 
-* § 61-1-20. Enforcement 
Whenever it appears to the director that a person has engaged, is engaging, or is about to engage in an act or practice 
constituting a violation of this chapter or a rule or order under this chapter, in addition to specrfic powers granted in 
this chapter: 
(l)(a) the director may issue an order directing the person to appear before the commission and show cause why an 
order should not be issued directing the person to cease and desist from engaging in the act or practice, or doing an 
act in furtherance of the activity; 
(b) the order to show cause shall state the reasons for the order and the date of the hearing; 
(c) the director shall promptly serve a copy of the order to show7 cause upon a person named in the order; 
(d) the commission shall hold a hearing on the order to show cause no sooner than ten business days after the or-
der is issued; 
(e) after a hearing, the commission may issue an order to cease and desist from engaging in an act or practice con-
stituting a violation of this chapter or a rule or order under this chapter; 
(f) the commission may impose a fine; 
(g) the commission may bar or suspend that person from associating with a licensed broker-dealer or investment 
adviser m this state ; and 
(h) the commission may impose a combination of sanctions in Subsections (l)(e) through (g). 
(2)(a) The director may bring an action in the appropriate district court of this state or the appropriate court of an-
other state to enjoin an act or practice and to enforce compliance with this chapter or a rule or order under this chap-
ter; 
(b) upon a proper showing in an action brought under this section, the court may: 
(l) issue a permanent or temporary, prohibitory or mandatory injunction; 
(n) issue a restraining order or writ of mandamus; 
(hi) enter a declaratory judgment; 
(iv) appomt a receiver or conservator for the defendant or the defendant's assets; 
(v) order disgorgement; 
(vi) order rescission; 
(vii) order restitution; 
(viii) impose a fine of not more than $10,000 for each violation of the chapter; and 
(ix) enter any other relief the court considers just; and 
(c) the court may not require the division to post a bond in an action brought under this Subsection (2). 
(3) An order issued under Subsection (1) shall be accompanied by written findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1963, c. 145, § l;Laws 1983, c. 284, § 29; Laws 1986, c. 107, § 1; Laws 1990. c. 133. § 13; Laws 1994. c. 12, 
§ 70; Laws 2009. c. 35L § 19, eff. May 12. 2009. 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Uniform Law 
This section is similar to § 408 of the Uniform Securities Act (1956). See Volume 7C Unrform Laws Annotated, 
Master Edition, or ULA Database on Westlaw. 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 61. Secunties Division-Real Estate Division 
"Hi Chapter 1. Utah Uniform Secunties Act (Refs & Annos) 
-+ § 61-1-21. Penalties for violations 
(1) A person is guilty7 of a third degree felony who willfully violates: 
(a) a provision of this chapter except Sections 61-1-1 and 61-1-16; 
(b) an order issued under this chapter; or 
(c) Section 61-1-16 knowing the statement made is false or misleading in a material respect. 
(2) A person who willfully violates Section 61-1-1: 
(a) is guilty of a third degree felony if, at the time the crime was committed, the property, money, or thmg unlaw-
fully obtained or sought to be obtained was worth less than $10,000; 
(b) is guilty of a second degree felony if: 
(l) at the time the crime was committed, the property, money, or thing unlawfully obtained or sought to be ob-
tained was worth $10,000 or more; or 
(\^i(A\^i at the t ime the cr ime was commit ted the nronertv moriev or thine? iin Inwfnllv c^ 'htmi"'. pd ov ^r^ntjHf tr* HP 
obtained was worth less than $10,000; and 
(B) in connection with that violation, the violator knowingly accepted any money representing: 
(I) equity in a person's primary residence; 
(II) a withdrawal from an individual retirement account; or 
(III) a withdrawal from a qualified retirement plan as defined in the Internal Revenue Code [FN1]; or 
(c) is guilty of an enhanced second degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not 
less than three years or more than 15 years if: 
(l) at the time the crime was committed, the property, money, or thing unlawfully obtained or sought to be ob-
tained was worth $10,000 or more; and 
(n) in connection with that violation, the violator knowmgly accepted any money representing: 
(A) equity in a person's primary residence; 
(B) a withdrawal from an individual retirement account; or 
(C) a withdrawal from a qualified retirement plan as defined in the Internal Revenue Code. 
(3) A person may not be imprisoned for the violation of an order issued under this chapter if the person proves that 
the person had no knowledge of the order. 
(4) In addition to any Qther penalty for a criminal violation of this chapter, the sentencing judge may impose a pen-
alty or remedy provided for in Subsection 61-l-20(2)(b). 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1963, c. 145, § 1; Laws 1971, c. 155, § l;Laws 1983, c. 284, § 30: Laws 1990, c. 133. § 14; Laws 1991. c. 
161. § 12; Laws 1992. c. 216. § 4; Laws 1997, c. 160, § 10. eff. May 5. 1997; Laws 2001. c. 149. § 1. eff. April 30. 
2001: Laws 2009, c. 347. § 11. eff. May 12. 2009; Laws 2009. c. 351. § 20, eff. May 12. 2009. 
[FN1] See26U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq. 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Composite section by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel of Laws 2009, c. 347, § 11 and Laws 
2009, c. 351, §20. 
Uniform L aw 
This section is similar to § 409 of the Uniform Securities Act (1956). See Volume 7C Uniform Laws Annotated, 
Master Edition, or ULA Database on Westlaw. 
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UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
Attorneys for Defendant 
51 South University Ave., Suite 206 
Provo, UT 84601 
Telephone: 801-852-1070 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
HAROLD EARL BUSHMAN, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO DISMISS BASED ON 
DOUBLE JEOPARDY VIOLATION 
CaseNo.071403474 
Judge Samuel McVey 
Based upon the facts and law set forth in the accompanying Memorandum, Defendant, 
HAROLD EARL BUSHMAN, through his counsel, Lisa M. Estrada, moves this court to dismiss 
the above cause number based on a violation of his constitutional rights, specifically the Double 
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article One, 
Section Twelve of the Utah State Constitution. 
DATED this *£> day of July, 2008. 
TTisaivl. Estrada 
Counsel for Defendant 
LISA M. ESTRADA (10765) 
UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
Attorneys for Defendant 
51 South University Avenue, Suite 206 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: (801)852-1070 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
Plaintiff, DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
v. 
HAROLD EARL BUSHMAN, Case No.071403474 
Defendant. 
Hon. Judge Samuel McVey 
HAROLD EARL BUSHMAN, Defendant, by and through counsel of record, Lisa M. 
Estrada, hereby moves this court to dismiss the above cause number as it is being prosecuted in 
violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article One, Section Twelve of the Utah State Constitution. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
1. May 16, 2007 Department of Commerce Securities Division files an Emergency Order to 
Cease and Desist and Order to Show Cause naming Harold Earl Bushman ("Bushman") 
as Respondent. 
2. July 3, 2007 Bushman and Michael Hines, Director of Enforcement sign a Stipulation and 
Consent Order with approval and signature of Jeff Buckner, Assistant Attorney General. 
Lhe facts are taken from Discovery provided to defense ("D"). Mr. Bushman does not adopt these facts 
2 
iii^u 
Id. 
3. Consent order contains the following provision: 
Requiring Bushman to pay a fine of nineteen thousand three hundred dollars ($19,300) to 
the Division by Monday, October 1, 2007, reduced dollar for dollar by any money paid to 
the victims by July 15, 2007. The total owed to the victims is $14,300. If Bushman pays 
the victims in full by July 15, 2007, the Division will waive half of the remaining fine of 
$5,000, leaving $2,500 due by October 1, 2007. If at any time the Division discovers that 
Bushman acted in violation of Utah securities laws, the waived portion of the fine will be 
due to the Division within one month of the date on which the Division gives Bushman 
written notice. Id. 
4. Consent order also contains the following language: 
".. .Consent Order does not affect any criminal cause of action that a prosecutor might 
bring/' 
5. Consent order contains the following provision: 
Bushman willfully violated § 61-1-1 of the Act by making misrepresentations of material 
fact and omitting to state material facts in connection with the offer and sale of a security 
in or from Utah. Id. 
6. Consent order also contains following: 
Bushman acknowledges that this Consent Order, upon approval by the Division Director, 
shall be the final compromise and settlement of this matter. 
7. July 3, 2007 Wayne Klein, Director Utah Division of Securities signed an order based 
upon the preceding information. This order is stamped with the Great Seal of the State of 
Utah Department of Commerce Division of Securities. 
8. The Division of Securities is a division of the Commercial Enforcement of the Criminal 
Division of the Utah Attorney General office, http://attorneygeneral.utah.gov/62.html 
for any purpose other than this motion and memorandum. 
3 
9. September 10, 2007 Bushman was charged by way of indictment oi Pattern of Unlawful 
Activity in \iolation of § 76-10-1603 and ten (10) counts of Securities Fraud in \iolation 
of §61-1-1. 
ARGUMENT 
BUSHMAN'S CONSENT ORDER BASED ON § 61-1-1, 
FINES, RESTITUTION AND POTENTIAL 3 R D DEGREE FELONY FOR VIOLATION 
ACTS AS PREVIOUS CONVICTION FOR DOUBLE JEOPARDY PURPOSES 
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees that no person shall be 
''subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb/* U.S. Const. Amend. V. 
Similarly Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution states that no ''person [shall] be twice put 
in jeopardy for the same offense." The theory of double jeopardy provides constitutional 
protection in three different scenaiios: (1) to protect against a second prosecution for the same 
offense after acquittal; (2) to protect against a second prosecution for the same offense after 
conviction; (3) to protect against multiple punishments for the same offense. State v Trafny, 799 
P.2d 704, 709 (Utah 1990). 
Double Jeopardy Clause protects only against imposition of multiple criminal 
punishments for same offense when such occurs in successive proceedings. Hudson v. United 
Stales, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997) (abrogating United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435). The consent 
order references § 61-1-1 of the Utah Uniform Securities Act as the basis for the violation the 
Division of Securities proceeded against Bushman on. Bushman was charged a $5,000 fine in 
conjunction with restitution. The fine was to be reduced to $2,500 upon timely payment of 
restitution. Bushman is now facing charges from the Utah County Attorney's office based on § 
The Supreme Court in Ward held Congress intended § 311(b)(6) to impose a civil penalty 
and the fact that § 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 makes criminal the 
conduct penalized civilly under § 311(b)(6) does not render the civil penalty criminal in nature. 
This is in direct contrast to this case as Bushman is being punished twice under the same section 
of the Securities Division Act. Because the Double Jeopardy Clause only protects against two 
criminal punishments Ward provides direction in determining the distinction between whether a 
statutorily defined penalty is civil or criminal. Id. at 248. Ward states the first inquiry is "whether 
a particular statutorily defined penalty is civil or criminal is a matter of statutory' construction/' 
Id. The enforcement and penalties of § 61-1-1 are found in separate sections contained within the 
Act. § 61-1-20 provides for the enforcement of the Act. § 61-1-20(1) of enforcement allows an 
"order to show cause" hearing, along with a fine. Enforcement is within the powers of the 
director of the Securities Division. § 61-l-20(2)(a) provides the director may bring an action in 
the appropriate district court etc. § 61-1 -20(2)(b) allows for an order of disgorgement, an order 
of rescission and a fine of not more than $500 per violation. § 61-1-21 provides for penalties for 
violations. The penalties for violation of § 61-1-1 are criminal. § 61-1-21(4) states wC[i]n addition 
to any other penalty for criminal violation of this chapter, the sentencing judge may impose any 
penalty or remedy provided for in Subsection 61-l-20(2)(b)." This would indicate the judge, at 
sentencing, is able to combine the sections to order an appropriate punishment. It is clear the 
enforcement is civil and the penalties are criminal. Thus after penalizing Bushman for violation 
of § 61-1-1 the state is precluded by Double Jeopardy from once again pursuing criminal charges 
and penalties. The Consent Order Cwshall be the final compromise and settlement of this matter." 
Stipulation and Consent Order pg 13. This language would indicate the Division would not 
pursue criminal charges. The Utah County Attorney's office pursuing criminal charges after there 
5 
has been a penalty for violation of § 61-1-1 is violating the Double Jeopard) Clause. 
Statutory construction would indicate greater protection under Utah state law as b\ the 
language it is anticipated any combining of the enforcement section and the penalty section is 
ordered at the same time by the judge should he deem it appropriate. Thus if the Criminal 
Division based Division of Securities and the Assistant Attorney General signs an agreement the 
average citizen would understand "final compromise and settlement of this matter'* to mean the 
matter is settled. 
The Utah Court of Appeals in State v Arbon, 909 P.2d 1270, 1272 (Ut Ct App 1996) in 
their analysis states: 
The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be subject for the same offense to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. This mandate extends to the states via the Fourteenth 
Amendment and forbids, among other things, multiple punishments imposed in separate 
proceedings for the same offense, (inner citations omitted). 
Arbon stands for the proposition that an administrative license suspension for Dl IT did not 
constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes. Arbon can be distinguished from the 
Bushman case. The revocation of a privilege (the driver's license) voluntarily granted, where the 
purpose of the privilege is to protect the public not to punish the individual driver is not a 
punishment. Indeed twno reference to the goals of punishment exists in the sections of the Act that 
outline causes and purposes of license revocations and suspensions." Id. at 1274. The Act in the 
Bushman case does provide for punishment as is clear from the previous paragraphs. 
This case can be distinguished from State v Mendoza, 938 P.2d 303 (Ut Ct App 1997). In 
Mendoza the Court of Appeals held the $200 fine and thirty days isolation imposed by the prison 
6 
disciplinary board for assault on a prison guard did not bar further prosecution in the district 
court for Assault on a Correctional Officer. Id. The lower court found the $200 went towards 
reimbursing the prison the costs of the prison disciplinary board hearing. Additionally the lower 
court found the fine and isolation served to encourage proper inmate behavior, as well as 
rehabilitation. The Court of Appeals affirmed. In dicta the Court indicates ccthe order of the 
proceedings is irrelevant; if the civil sanction constitutes punishment under double jeopard)7, then 
a subsequent prosecution for the same conduct is barred. Id. at FN3. In the present case Bushman 
was investigated and an order was entered commensurate with a violation of § 61-1-1 of the Utah 
Uniform Securities Act. The terms of the Stipulation and Consent Order specifically state 
"Bushman violated § 61-1-1 of the Act/" Stipulation and Consent Order pg.12. Bushman is 
being charged and put at jeopardy for a second lime for an alleged violation of § 61-1-1 of the 
Utah Uniform Securities Act by a criminal agency acting on behalf of the State of Utah. 
CONCLUSION 
The Stipulation and Consent Order entered on July 3, 2007, after criminal investigation of 
violation of § 61-1-1 of the Utah Uniform Securities Act, acts as a bar under the Double Jeopardy 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment which guarantees that no person shall be "subject for the same 
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb/7 U.S. Const. Amend. V. And under Article I, 
Section 12 of the Utah Constitution which states that no "person [shall] be twice put in jeopardy 
for the same offense.'' Bushman respectfully requests the Court dismiss this charge as a violation 
of his constitutional rights. 
7 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED thi sSo davofJulv. 2008. 
LISA M. ESTRADA 
Attorney for Defendant 
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